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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EXHAUSTION
OF STATE REMEDIES IN FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS
A prisoner, confined pursuant to a judgment of a state court, who
seeks federal habeas corpus relief must allege the deprivation of a right
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution or the statutes or treaties of the
United States.' In order for a federal court to exercise its remedial power
to grant the writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must also have met the
exhaustion of state remedies requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 This
statute provides that the prisoner must either have presented the alleged
deprivation of right to the courts of the state in which he is confined, or
show in his federal habeas corpus petition that there is no state corrective
process available to him or that the available state corrective process
would be ineffective because of special circumstances.' The exhaustion
requirement is designed not to frustrate the acquisition of relief in the
federal courts but rather to afford the state courts an opportunity to
correct any errors made in the state criminal process In practice, however, the doctrine has often confused federal courts' and has been misapplied by many to the detriment of the state prisoner.'
128 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970). This statute pertains to the power of federal courts to
grant the writ of habeas corpus and provides in relevant part:
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States ...

006

Id.
Habeas corpus relief for federal prisoners is provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
2
This requirement was originally judge-made but was eventually codified in 1948. See
text accompanying notes 59-67.
328 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970). The statute provides:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances renderin' such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
Id. See note 62 infra.
1R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 164 (2d ed. 1969).
5
E.g., United States ex rel. Murdaugh v. Murphy, 183 F. Supp. 440 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
The court commented: "I am never certain that we have any rigidity or definiteness in the
procedures of [the application of the exhaustion requirement]." Id. at 442.
OSee, e.g., Hammond v. North Carolina, 227 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.C. 1964); Monroe v.
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In Young v. Maryland,7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals divided
on the question of whether a state prisoner had sufficiently presented in
the state courts certain of his alleged deprivations of right. The majority
and dissent in Young disagreed about whether the contentions of the
petitioner should be categorized as claims or arguments within the structure of section 2254.8 The majority held that two contentions asserted in
the circuit court, which could have been legitimate constitutional claims
in a separate habeas corpus petition, were new constitutional claims and
thus required a prior presentation in the state courts? While not denying
that the contentions could have been independent constitutional claims in
some other petition, the dissent maintained that these contentions were
merely supporting arguments for the basic constitutional claim of
Young's habeas corpus petition and as arguments did not require prior
presentation to the state courts. 0 It would seem that the crux of the
difference between the two opinions in Young is whether a contention
which invokes a constitutional provision and could thereby qualify as an
independent but "unexhausted" habeas corpus claim must therefore be
asserted exclusively as a constitutional "claim," or whether in some contexts such a contention can be utilized flexibly by the petitioner in a lesser
role as part of a supporting "argument" for his "exhausted" constitutional claim. Young is particularly appropriate for demonstrating the
uncertainty in the exhaustion area of the law of habeas corpus in that to
Director, 227 F. Supp. 295 (D. Md. 1964). In these cases, the courts applied the exhaustion
of state remedies requirement as a prerequisite to their jurisdiction to grant the writ. The
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional
limitation on federal courts. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963); Bowen v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939).
7455 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 407 U.S. 915 (1972).
8
The words "claim" and "argument" are not part of the statutory language of either
§ 2241 or § 2254. However, "custody in violation of the Constitution" is the basis for
virtually all habeas corpus cases today and the type of issue that can be raised under this
provision runs the entire gamut of constitutional law. R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
38-39 (2d ed. 1969). It is clear from the Supreme Court cases that the phrase "constitutional
claim" means an allegation of deprivation of right guaranteed by some constitutional
provision. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 394 (1963).
When discussing exhaustion of state remedies in federal habeas corpus, the choice of
an appropriate word with which to label an issue presented to a court is difficult, since
fundamentally different consequences flow from whether the issue is a "claim" or an "argument." Use of either of these two readily available words would tend to imply conclusions
about the nature of that issue and its resulting treatment under the exhaustion doctrine. In
order to avoid this threshold semantic problem, the word "contention" will be used as a
neutral label when no implications about an issue's treatment under the exhaustion doctrine
are intended.
'455 F.2d at 681, 686. Note 22 infra.
1455 F.2d at 686.
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support their respective positions both majority and dissent cited Picard
v. Connor," a recent Supreme Court opinion dealing with the exhaustion
requirement.
The petitioner in Young was convicted of burglary and rape in 1960
and received a ten year prison sentence for burglary and a death sentence
for rape, although the latter was commuted by executive action to confinement for life." During post-conviction appeal in the state courts,
Young asserted a deprivation of his fourth amendment right 3 in that
after his arrest police had seized evidence from a room which Young
rented in his father's home by explaining to his father that they merely
wanted to gather some clothing for Young to wear while in jail. 4 Young
maintained on appeal that the admission of the evidence in question, a
trenchcoat upon which there were spermatozoa stains, prejudiced his trial
in that it tended to prove forcible rape when the only issue had been
Young's credibility in insisting that the intercourse had been consensual. 5
This argument, rooted in the fourth amendment, was found to be without
merit by the Supreme Court of Maryland, whereupon Young petitioned
the federal district court for habeas corpus relief. The district court found
the petitioner's claim meritorious and granted relief. The State of Maryland then appealed the grant of habeas relief to the Fourth Circuit.
In the circuit court, Young asserted for the first time"6 the contentions
upon which the exhaustion disagreement centered. There Young articulated a contention that his trial had been prejudiced because the police
had expoited the illegally seized trenchcoat to coerce an admission of the
intercourse. Young further contended that the introduction of the coat
into evidence compelled him to take the stand to repeat his denial of
"404 U.S. 270 (1971).
1455 F.2d at 680.
2

" The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and

the pesons or things to be seized.
amend. IV.
1455 F.2d at 682.
"Id. at 680-81.
"Id. at 681. The court commented:
During the argument in this Court, the possibility that the trenchcoat may
have been improperly used by police to induce the appellee's confession

U.S. CONsT.

was suggested. Until that time, there has not been even a remote contention either in the State Court or in the District Court that appellee's
confession has been induced by the seizure of the trenchcoat.
"455 F.2d at 685.
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forcible rape, a decision which he would not have made had the coat not
been admitted into evidence.18 The circuit court reversed the grant of
habeas relief but its grounds for doing so were not based entirely on lack
of prior presentation of these two contentions.
The circuit court went through a two-step process to reach its decision. First, the court determined that it need not deal with the merits of
Young's fourth amendment claim because the "admission of the trenchcoat was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was accordingly immaterial whether the trenchcoat had been illegally seized. '"19'
However, the court added parenthetically that there was some support for
finding that the search was constitutional." The finding of harmless error
was based on the fact that Young confessed to the act of intercourse as
well as having worn the trenchcoat during the act. The court reasoned
that the admission of the trenchcoat into evidence was not prejudicial
because the only act it could possibly tend to prove was one which the
petitioner admitted.2 ' The court's second step was contained in a brief
discussion of the nature of the newly asserted contentions. Judge Russell's
opinion for the majority concluded that, since Young's induced admission
contention constituted a "claim" which had not even been raised remotely
22
in the state courts, this claim was unexhausted.
The majority believed the case of Picardv. Connor2 to be analogous
to the exhaustion of remedies question in Young and cited Picard as
authority for its finding that Young had not adequately raised the claim
of coerced admission in the state courts. Picard is a case in which the
Supreme Court apparently attempted to dispel confusion over how sufficiently a state prisoner must present his claims of deprivation to a state
court in order to be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief. The precise
holding of Picardis that the "substance of a federal habeas corpus claim
must first be presented to the state courts. ' 24 An examination of the facts
in Picardis necessary for an understanding of the test for which the case
seems to stand and its application to the exhaustion controversy in
Young.
In Picard,the Court reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals which
8d.

"Id.
at 680.
2
1d. The court cited no authority for this statement.
2
The majority did not answer the dissent's argument that there may have been prejudicial results from the inflammatory use of the trenchcoat at trial. See note 41 infra.
22455 F.2d at 681. For a reason not explained in either the majority or dissenting
opinions, the majority recognized only one new "claim," the coercion of the admission, and
did not deal with the contention that Young was prejudicially forced to take the witness
stand.
23404
U.S. 270 (1971).
2
'ld. at 278.
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had granted relief to a state prisoner 21 on an equal protection ground
which the circuit court admitted had not been urged in the state courts
or in the respondent's habeas corpus petition.26 In the state courts, Connor's principal ground for seeking relief had been a contention that the
Massachusetts "fictitious name" statute27 violated the fifth amendment's
requirement of a grand jury indictment. This statute authorized his name
to be inserted in an indictment after the indictment had been delivered in
"John Doe" form by a grand jury. The Supreme Court examined the pretrial, trial, appellate, and habeas corpus papers without finding a hint of
any attack on the indictment as violative of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court concluded that the issue entered
the case solely because the First Circuit injected it28 and obviously could
not have been presented in the state courts.
As both the First Circuit and the Supreme Court pointed out, Picard
was not a case in which factual allegations were made in the federal courts
which were not made in the state courts.2 9 The issue, simply stated, was
whether the state courts had a fair opportunity to rule on the equal
2'Connor v. Picard, 434 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1970), rev'd., 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
2434

F.2d at 674. As the First Circuit stated:

Petitioner did not present the constitutional question to the Massachusetts
court in the particularfocus in which this opinion is directed. We suggested it when the case reached us, and invited the Commonwealthi to file
a supplemental brief (emphasis added).
Id.
ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 19 (1968).
404 U.S. at 277.
"Id. at 276. Introduction of new facts in a federal court which are relevant to the
disposition of a petitioner's constitutional claim will cause a federal court to require a
presentation of these facts to a state court. See, e.g., Buffalo Chief v. South Dakota, 425
F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1970); Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964).
In order for the circuit court in Young to have ruled on the coerced admission and
involuntary testimony contentions, there must have been enough facts in the record for these
contentions to be more than mere conclusory allegations. In light of standards set up by
the Fourth Circuit for the sufficiency of factual support in the record, Young's two contentions could possibly have been disposed of without reaching their merits because of inadequate factual development.
In Thompson v. Peyton, 406 F.2d 473, 474-75 (4th Cir. 1968), it was held that factual
matters necessary for determination of exhaustion questions are sufficiently presented if a
state court could rule on thenm as a matter of law without the necessity of a further evidentiary hearing. The dissent in Young, in an attempt to show that the petitioner had sufficiently developed the facts behind his coerced admission contention, pointed out that the
record indicated that Young had been held incommunicado for seventeen hours without
admitting intercourse but then admitted the sexual contact less than one hour after the coat
was seized. 455 F.2d at 686. In addition, the confession itself contained a reference to the
coat. 455 F.2d at 686 & n.4. Under the Thompson standard it is possible that the Fourth
Circuit would have held these facts insufficient.
'MASS.
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protection claim. The Court held that this claim had not been fairly
presented to the state courts even though facts pointing to a denial of
equal protection were evident on the record.3 1 Since the equal protection
claim was not the substantial equivalent of the fifth amendment claim, it
was a completely new constitutional claim requiring presentation in the
state courts.
The Court qualified its holding in Picardby expressly approving of
the results in United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate.3 It followed the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning that there are instances in which "'the ultimate question for disposition' . . . will be the same despite variations in
the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its support. ' 32 The circuit
court in Kemp used the phrase "ultimate question for disposition" to
mean the basic issue which is the reason behind the attempt to acquire
habeas corpus relief.33 The Kemp petitioner's ultimate question for disposition was a fifth amendment claim of coerced confession. In the state
court, Kemp supported his claim by emphasizing physical coercion but
in his federal habeas corpus petition, the emphasis changed to psychological coercion and the totality of the circumstances.3 4 The Court in Picard
concluded from the approved Kemp language that it would not have been
necessary for the petitioner in Picardto have cited "book and verse" from
the Federal Constitution in the state courts regarding his equal protection
claim to be eligible to present it to the federal courts.3 s But to benefit
from this limitation to the exhaustion doctrine, the contention in the
federal court, taking into account all new supporting legal theories advanced there, must have been the substantial equivalent of the contention
in the state court. The Court was unable to find such a relationship
between the Picard petitioner's fifth amendment and equal protection
3404 U.S. at 277. The Court commented:

To be sure, respondent presented all facts. Yet the constitutional claim the
Court of Appeals found inherent in those facts was never brought to the
attention of the state courts.
Id.
31359 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1966).

11404 U.S. at 277.
3The court explained:
The involuntary confession question presented to the district court by the
petitioner was submitted in a substantially similar fashion to the Illinois
Supreme Court. The evidence in the record before the state court was
essentially the same. The ultimate questionfor disposition-the voluntariness of the petitioner's confession-was precisely the same (emphasis
added).
359 F.2d at 751.
3
"Id. at 750.
-404 U.S. at 277-78.
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claims."6 Thus it would seem clear that if the ultimate question for

disposition remains constant between the state and federal courts, the
"substance" of a petitioner's habeas corpus claim will have been pre37

sented to the state court sufficiently enough to meet the Picardtest.
In Young, the majority cited Picard as sufficiently analogous to be
support for the proposition that the petitioner's claim of coerced admission was not presented to the state courts. 38 It would seem that the circuit
court did not see this claim as in any way supporting the basic fourth
amendment claim made by Young, just as Connor's fourteenth amendment claim was found by the Supreme Court in Picardto be a new claim
and not support for his fifth amendment claim.3 9 The coerced admission
3

d. at 278.

1Although the Court apparently intended the Kemp language to be a modification of
its holding in Picard,it is not entirely clear how dissimilar two contentions can be and yet
still be considered supportive of the same ultimate question for disposition under the Kemp
modification. The two legal theories in Kemp, physical and psychological coercion of a
confession, are both matters relating to the fifth amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. The Court in Picardcited the two legal theories espoused by the petitioner
in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), as ready examples of the permissible
variations in legal theory under the Kemp holding. 404 U.S. at 277. Sanders involved
successive applications for habeas corpus relief by a federal prisoner under § 2255. However, the Sanders example does not shed light on how dissimilar two legal theories can be
since the legal theories in Sanders were identical to those in Kemp: physical and psychological coercion. "But a claim of involuntary confession predicated on alleged psychological
coercion does not raise a different 'ground' than does one predicated on alleged physical
coercion." 373 U.S. at 16.
-"455 F.2d at 681. There are two viewpoints implicit in the Young opinion. The first,
adopted by the majority, is that at some point a contention in a federal court becomes so
dissimilar from a contention made in the state courts that it can be characterized as either
supporting a new claim or becoming itself a new claim. Applied to the specific facts in
Young, this viewpoint dictated that the coerced admission contention, on its face a fifth
amendment consideration and thus dissimilar from the fourth amendment claim urged in
the state courts, was itself a new constitutional claim. A second viewpoint, seemingly
espoused by the Young dissent, is that as long as the petitioner presents the two contentions
within the context of the same basic claim and as long as they can be characterized as
supporting arguments for this claim, the apparent dissimilarity on the face of the two
contentions is not relevant. Thus a contention which might on its face be a fifth amendment
consideration could be legitimately asserted in the federal courts in support of a fourth
amendment claim as long as the basic nature of the fourth amendment claim is not somehow
altered.
"'It is difficult to imagine how a petitioner could present a contention that he was
denied the equal protection of the law in such a way that it became a supporting argument
for a claim that his indictment was illegal because it failed to comport with the fifth
amendment's requirement of a grand jury indictment. However, a fifth amendment supporting argument for a fourth amendment claim is not an improbable combination and in light
of several Supreme Court cases, the Fourth Circuit should have been at least somewhat
sensitive to their close relationship. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Mr.
Justice Bradley commented:
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claim evidently appeared to be an independent constitutional claim requiring prior presentation to the state courts. By divorcing the coerced
admission claim from the fourth amendment claim, the circuit court was
thus able to dispose of the latter through a harmless error finding, a
disposition which would not have been possible had the majority admitted
the possibility that a contention could be either an independent claim or
an argument supporting a claim, depending on how it is presented. 0 The
finding of harmless error was sufficient to overcome the argument of
prejudice from the probative value of the trenchcoat's admission; but it
is doubtful that arguments emphasizing the trenchcoat's inflammatory
effect4 or the prejudice resulting from the coerced admission of the intercourse itself could have been blunted by the harmless error rule.4
Standing independently of the fourth amendment claim, the facts and
arguments bearing upon Young's coerced admission contention would fit
nicely within the general focus of the fifth amendment.4 3 In fact, in order
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the [fourth amendment and fifth amendment]. They throw great light on each other. For the
"unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give
evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment. . . . And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.
Id. at 633. More recently, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961), the Court found
that the fourth and fifth amendments enjoy an "intimate relation." See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4
It is unclear from Judge Russell's opinion exactly how the majority saw this contention. In the paragraph of the opinion which discusses the contention, it is first treated as if
it might be a contingent claim depending upon the validity of the fourth amendment claim:
"During argument in this Court, the possibility that the trenchcoat may have been improperly used by the police to induce the appellee's confession was suggested." 455 F.2d at 681
(emphasis added). Yet further in the same paragraph, the coerced admission contention is
treated as if it were a completely independent fifth amendment claim: "The appellee has
never testified he was coerced in giving his confession . . . .This Court, on a record barren
of any evidence that the confession was coerced, may not assume its involuntariness." Id.
at 681 (emphasis added).
4
Judge Sobeloff maintained that the fact that Young's trial was before a judge did not
alter the pervasive prejudicial effects of the trenchcoat. He pointed out that the not unlikely
impact of the physical production of the coat at trial was to divert the fact finder from a
true assessment of its evidentiary value. Id. at 686-87.
2
1 1n Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967), it was stated that any error which
"possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant" could not be harmless.
43
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . ..
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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to maintain a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a petitioner must be able

to portray his claimed deprivation as a deprivation of a right or privilege
guaranteed by a statutory or constitutional provision," such as the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Where a federal habeas
corpus petitioner has been unable to do this, as where the petitioner
alleged a violation of a state statute 5 or a defect in procedure of less than

constitutional stature," the writ has been held unavailable. It may be that
the Fourth Circuit's finding that Young's coerced admission contention
was a constitutional claim, wholly independent from his fourth amendment claim, was facilitated by the fact that his contention could have

stood on its own as a constitutional claim had it been the sole allegation
of a deprivation of a constitutional right made in the petition.
The dissent in Young disagreed with the majority in both steps of the
majority's two-step decisional process. Judge Sobeloff pointed out initially that the search made by the police, when tested against the wellsettled standards in the consent-to-search area of the law,47 violated the

petitioner's right under the fourth amendment. He then proceeded to
show how the illegally seized evidence had been both directly and indi-

rectly prejudicial." The opinion emphasized that because the coat was the
only piece of evidence introduced against Young on the rape charge" and
because judges' minds are not impervious to misleading influences such

as a dramatic flourishing of the stained trenchcoat at trial, 5 there was a

reasonable possibility that the admission of the trenchcoat into evidence
was directly prejudicial and contributed to the conviction. The majority
opinion appears to treat the coerced admission claim as independent of
"See note I supra.
"McCord v. Henderson, 384 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939).
T
The dissent relied on Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965), which held that
evidence seized from a habeas corpus petitioner's room after his mother had consented to
the search was improperly admitted at trial because the bureau from which the evidence
was seized was set aside exclusively for the petitioner and thus only he could give constitutionally effective permission for the search.
"In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962), it was held that evidence seized
unlawfully could neither be proof against the victim of the search nor against one who might
be indirectly prejudiced by the evidence, though not the victim of the search. That the
exclusionary rule extends to both the direct and indirect products of an illegal search was
settled in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), in which Mr.
Justice Holmes commented:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all.
251 U.S. at 392.
11455 F.2d at 684.
mJd. at 686-87.
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the main fourth amendment claim even though the admission was allegedly coerced by the fruits of the seizure. Rather than characterizing the
coerced admission and involuntary testimony contentions made by
Young as independent claims, the dissent interpreted these as arguments
indicating indirect prejudicial effects of the illegal seizure of the trenchcoat. Judge Sobeloff pointed out that it was not necessary for the petitioner to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that prejudice existed,5 as the
majority seemed to require. Rather, the burden was on the state to prove
that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a burden which
the state had failed to sustain. 52
It would seem that the dissent's most fundamental difference with the
majority lies in its interpretation of Picardand the resulting application
of the Picardtest to the situation in Young. Judge Sobeloff evidently read
Picard as allowing arguments which might, on their face, fit under a
constitutional provision different than the one articulated in the state
courts as long as the basic, ultimate claim for disposition was not changed
as the result of the assertion of the new arguments in the federal courts. 3
That Young's new contentions could possibly qualify as constitutional
claims should not functionally fix them as "claims" to the exclusion of
their use as supporting "arguments" in the total scheme of the petitioner's
fourth amendment thrust. Thus the majority was accused of indulging in
an overly technical view of the exhaustion requirement54 in that it evidently set up a mutually exclusive dichotomy between those contentions
which can be characterized as claims and those which can be characterized as arguments supporting claims.
The dissenting opinion stated that the exhaustion of state remedies
doctrine requires only that the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim
must first be presented to a state court." Judge Sobeloff's use of the word
51

1d. at 684.

52

1d.
'3n this

reading of the Picardcase, the dissent is joined by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. In Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit held that
a claim in the state courts, that the petitioner was denied his right to appeal because his
court-appointed counsel filed a futile motion for an extension of time instead of filing a
timely motion for a new trial, was not changed simply because he framed his claim in the
federal courts as one of incompetence of counsel. As the court posed the issue:
Our question then is whether petitioner's emphasis on the incompetence
221
of counsel in the federal court is a mere variation of the legal theory
222
presented to the Indiana Supreme Court or should be regarded as a differ223
ent claim. In view of the holding in Picard, the question is not free of
224
doubt, but in our judgment we are dealing with a variation of the same
225
claim rather than a different legal ground.
Id. at 948.
"455 F.2d at 686.
1Id. at 685 & n.2a.
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"only" to preface the Picard holding would seem to indicate that he
interpreted the word "substance" to mean "basic thrust" of the ultimate
claim for disposition. This basic thrust, without the polish of all the legal
arguments which may be used in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is
all the state court should need in order to apply controlling legal principles.56 Accordingly, the substance of Young's habeas corpus claim, that
he was the victim of an unconstitutional search and seizure, was not
changed by the addition of new arguments in the federal courts. The
dissent had no difficulty distinguishing Young from Picard,in which the
fifth amendment indictment question posed to the state courts was transformed into an entirely distinct equal protection question in the federal
courts.57 Instead, the whole tenor of Judge Sobeloff's opinion implies that
Young fits within the Kemp limitation of Picard.
It is not entirely clear from the procedural facts of Young and Kemp,
however, that these two cases actually belong in the same category. In
Kemp, the petitioner's ultimate question for disposition was a fifth
amendment claim of coerced confession. The two legal theories which
Kemp asserted bore directly upon the question of a possible constitutional
violation in procuring the confession. But once this coercion was shown,
no question of prejudice or harmless error could have arisen since admission of a coerced confession into evidence is prejudicial per se.51 In
Young, on the other hand, the petitioner needed to show both a constitutional violation in the search and sufficient prejudice resulting from the
admission of the tainted evidence to render his trial unfair. The new
contentions in Young, which the majority determined to be new claims,
were directed at strengthening the petitioner's showing of total prejudice
and not at the basic constitutional violation as were those in Kemp.
Therefore, Young would seem sui generis on its facts and not subject to
categorization with Kemp since in the latter case the distinction between
the constitutional violation and the effects flowing from that violation
was of no importance.
It may be that the dissent felt it unnecessary to point out that the new
contentions raised in the federal courts by Young and Kemp applied to
different steps in proof. Taking a broader view of the Picardand Kemp
language than is implicit in this sort of distinction, Young may have
satisfied the requirement that he present the substance of his claim to the
state courts even though his arguments as to the effect of the alleged
constitutional violation on the fairness of his trial were not as completely
articulated at the state level as they were at the federal level. Although
5
Cf. Sullivan v. Scafati, 428 F.2d 1023 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001
(1971); Wilbur v. Maine, 421 F.2d 1327 (1st Cir. 1970).
51455 F.2d at 685 & n.2a.
uSee, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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not explicitly stated in his opinion, it can be assumed that Judge Sobeloff
saw no practical or important difference between new legal theories bearing on an alleged constitutional violation and new legal theories bearing
on the effect of an alleged constitutional violation so long as the ultimate
question for disposition remained unaltered in either case. If this assumption is correct, the dissent has, in effect, pointed out that the important
distinction for a habeas corpus petitioner to make is the one between
those arguments which change the nature of his claim and those arguments which do not, regardless of the stage of proof at which they are
made or any other collateral characteristic.
The history and policy behind the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine lend support to the dissent's position in Young, which seems to be
a more flexible interpretation of section 2254 than is evidenced by the
majority opinion. The doctrine had its beginning in Ex parte Royall,"9 a
case which held that federal courts had the power to grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a state prisoner even in advance of a trial. The Court
cautioned, however, that this power should be tempered by discretion as
to the time and mode of its exercise. Considerations of comity between
the state and federal court system would be paramount in exercising this
discretion,"0 but federal court abstention would be subordinated to any
special circumstances requiring immediate action. What was originally a
flexible principle encompassing discretion not to grant the writ gradually
became hardened into a rule that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the lower federal courts must refuse to grant a writ of habeas
corpus unless state remedies have been exhausted.61 The codification of
the exhaustion doctrine in section 2254 then followed,"2 coming at a time
when the doctrine was being rigidly applied. It was not until the trilogy
of cases"2 beginning with Fay v. Noial4 in 1963 that the Supreme Court
5,117 U.S. 241 (1886). The exhaustion of state remedies doctrine was further elaborated
upon in Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231 (1895), and Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399
(1900).
"in United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 7 (1906), the Supreme Court
commented on the reason for this deference to comity:
It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the Federal courts by
which a person under indictment in a state court and subject to its laws
may, by the decision of a single judge of the Federal court, upon a writ of
habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody of the officers of the State and
finally discharged therefrom. ...
Id.
"lEx parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
6
'The original statute, Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 153, § 2254, 62 Stat. 967, was enacted
four years after Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), but was amended to its present form
in 1958.
63Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (federal courts have power under the federal habeas
corpus statutes to grant relief despite the applicant's failure to have pursued a state remedy
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reaffirmed the flexibility of the exhaustion doctrine and federal courts

began giving full consideration to policies of timely vindication15 and
judicial efficiency" as well as to the oft-invoked policy of comity. 7
A flexible interpretation of section 2254 is also consistent with deci-

sions stating that habeas corpus was never intended to be a narrow,
formalistic remedy. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Picard,
recognized that nicety of analysis is not a valuable or functional concept
in the area of exhaustion of state remedies. 9 By concerning itself with
how a legal argument appeared on its face rather than looking to the
argument's actual substantive effect on the total scheme of petitioner's

claimed deprivation of right, the majority in Young seems to indulge in
not available to him at the time he applies), Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (where
facts are in dispute, federal courts in habeas corpus cases must hold evidentiary hearing in
a state court), and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (controlling weight must
not be given to denial of prior habeas applications if not adjudicated on the merits or if a
new ground is presented) are said to be the liberalizing trilogy. Laubach, Exhaustion of
State Remedies as a Prerequisiteto FederalHabeas Corpus: A Summary, 1966-1971, 7
GONZAGA L. REv. 34 (1971).
64372 U.S. 391 (1963).
6See Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Davis v.
Henderson, 330 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. La. 1971).
"See United States ex rel. Newman v. Brierly, 420 F.2d 781 (3rd Cir. 1970); Phelper
v. Decker, 401 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1968); Kennedy v. Sigler, 397 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1968);
United States ex rel. Levy v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1968).
"7Given the Fourth Circuit's handling of exhaustion of state remedies issues in cases
spanning the past five years, it is somewhat surprising that it would take a narrow view of
the requirement in its disposition of Young. The Fourth Circuit has been characterized as
having a moderate to liberal approach to exhaustion matters. Laubach, supra note 63, at
48. A review of some Fourth Circuit cases bears out this characterization.
In Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969), the Fourth Circuit determined that raising a new issue in the final paragraph of an addendum to petitioner's
application should not, from the standpoint of comity, require an exhaustion of the new
claim before a federal court could address itself to the fully exhausted claim. Other federal
courts have been reluctant to hear fewer than all the issues asserted in a habeas corpus
petition. See Morgan v. Beto, 313 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Howard v. Craven, 306
F. Supp. 730 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
In Sheftic v. Boles, 377 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967), the court
held that the real benefit derived from allowing prisoners, who had presented the same
claims in a state court three years earlier, to present their claims in the federal courts would
outweigh any tangential benefits which might accrue to the cause of federalism by sending
the petitioners back to the state courts. Similarly, in Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th
Cir. 1967), the court was willing to find exhaustion in the state courts even though the state
argued that the issue had not been lucidly presented there. In dicta, the court brushed aside
the state's objections by saying that judges must not depend on the arguments of lawyers
for the limits of their perception and analysis but must know and understand many things
not intelligently presented by lawyers in a particular case.
"Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
11404 U.S. at 281.
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the very type of academic analysis against which Mr. Justice Douglas
warned.
An inclination to read Picard as a device with which to foreclose
somewhat the availability of habeas corpus relief is understandable in
light of the barrage of habeas corpus applications that federal courts in
general, 0 and the Fourth Circuit in particular,71 have received in recent
years. However, making the vindication of constitutional guarantees
more difficult is a questionable means of easing the burden at best.12 In
reality, both state and federal courts are responsible for the administration of the criminal justice system in the United States. Thus, at least in
terms of judicial economy, it should make no difference whether a federal
court or a state court ultimately decides a prisoner's claim. To base a
justification for returning a state prisoner who has made a colorable
attempt to exhaust state remedies upon a desire for federal judicial economy would seem to ignore the fact that reviewing the petition of a prisoner such as Young and subsequently sending him back to the state courts
itself wastes judicial energy.
What would seem to be the most unfortunate aspect of a formalistic
application of the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine is that the petitioner with a meritorious claim remains confined, at least during the time
needed for the claimed deprivation of right to be heard in a state court.
The decision in Young may have the effect of making it more difficult
for a state prisoner to achieve a hearing on a claimed deprivation of right
in a forum which, in terms of orientation toward federal constitutional
matters, is preferable to a state court. A prisoner who seeks habeas
corpus relief in the Fourth Circuit and refashions his legal arguments in
the federal courts runs the risk that his arguments may be found to be
unexhausted constitutional claims. It would seem that a speedy vindication of constitutional deprivations in the criminal justice process cannot
countenance the impediment of a formalistic view of section 2254. Otherwise the federal courts would "make a trap out of the exhaustion doctrine
which promises to exhaust the litigant and his resources, not the remedies. '7 3 Thus it is submitted that between the majority and dissenting
viewpoints in Young the flexibility of the latter is far more desirable.
A.

NEAL BARKUS

70
0f the 10,798 appeals filed in the United States courts of appeals during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1971, the largest single source was federal question habeas corpus
petitions amounting to a total of 1,261. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 252-53 (1971).
71

Of the total civil cases pending in the United States district courts on June 30, 1971,

only the district courts in the Fifth Circuit had a greater number of habeas corpus petitions
from state prisoners than did the district courts in the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 272-73.
"2An obvious alternative solution is to increase the number of federal judgeships. See
Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1972 at A 13, col. 7.
11404 U.S. at 281.

